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ABSTRACT
Most students of international relations feel that recognition of a new 
government is  primarily a political act. However, it has been contended 
notably by Professor Lauterpacht that the act is  basically legal in nature. A 
study of the problem of Canadian recognition of Communist China shows that 
in Canada the question has been considered from a political rather than legal 
point of view.
In Canada there was agreement during the period under considera­
tion, 1949-60, that certain criteria must be attained by a government before 
it can expect to be recognized. Once these conditions have been met, how­
ever, a government does not have a right to be recognized nor do other states 
have the obligation to recognize the new government. A state will accord re­
cognition when it feels its national self-interests will be best served by that act.
Neither the Liberal nor the Conservative administrations which held 
office in the period felt that Canada could gain more than it lost by granting 
recognition to Red China. As a result the Peking regime was denied Canadian 
recognition. The C .C .F . party interpreted the political stiuation differently 
and decided that recognition would have been a wise course of action. j
Several conditions in the political realm influenced the thought of 
Canadian political parties on this issu e. The same realities, however, did not 
evince sim ilar reactions. Among the factors which had to be considered were 
the attitudes of Canada's a llies, the effect recognition would have on the rest of 
Asia and the possibilities of expanding Canadian trade.
iii
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Whatever the views of the political parties were, they were based 
on political m otives. The problem of recognition of Communist China was 
not a legal problem in Canada.
/
iv
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PREFACE
There has been some dispute as to whether recognition is primarily 
a legal or political problem in the field of international relations. The pur­
pose of this thesis is  to attempt to show that as far as^the Canadian consider­
ation of recognition of the Central government of the Peoples' Republic of 
China is  concerned the problem is  primarily political in nature. A study of 
the positions of Canadian political parties on this matter will prove that 
political rather than legal arguments enjoy primacy.
Chapter I is  an introductory chapter which will discuss the problem 
of recognition in international relations. Also included is a brief discussion  
of Sino-Canadian relations and Canadian foreign policy which is intended to 
provide some background material for the discussion. The next chapter will 
present an historical outline of the problem. Each following chapter will be 
devoted to the arguments of a particular political party with regard to the 
problem and an attempt to show that these arguments are politically rooted. 
Social Credit thought on the subject will be included as a section of the chapter 
on Progressive Conservative attitudes since it is  most sim ilar and does not 
warrant a chapter of its own. The period to be considered extends from ^  
October 1949 to the end of 1960.
|Pr->ir»-y
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IINTRODUCTION
1. The Question of Recognition in International Law
The recognition of the new government of a state which has already 
been recognized is the free act by which one or several states 
acknowledge that a person or group of persons are capable of 
binding the State which they claim to represent, and witness their 
intention to enter into relations with them. 1
So reads Article 10 of the Resolution adopted by the Institute of International
Law at B russels, April, 1936 concerning the recognition of new states and
new governments. This seems to be a fairly straight-forward doctrine not
calculated to raise great controversy in foreign relations. However, the
question is  rendered much more complex by other considerations.
Whether or not a new state Qor new state new government can 
be injected mutatis mutandis!] has actually begun to exist is  a 
pure question of fact; and as international law does not provide 
any machinery for authoritative declaration on this question, it 
is  one which every other state must answer for itself as best 
it can .2
The question, although usually answered easily , can present problems. P re­
mature recognition constitutes interference in the internal affairs of the state 
and as long as a struggle continues, recognition is premature. "On the other 
hand mere persistence of the old state government in a struggle which has
^The Law of Nations, C ases. Documents and Notes, edited by Herbert 
W. Briggs, (New York: F .S . Crofts and C o ., 1944), p .78.
2 j .L . Brierly, The Law of Nations, (5th ed.; Oxford: The Clarendon 
P r ess , 1955), p . 129.
1
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2 ,
obviously become hopeless is not a sufficient cause for withholding i t .”3
Two schools of thought exist on just what recognition represents. One 
school (led by Professor Lauterpacht) holds that recognition is  a constitutive 
act. Through recognition a government becomes an international entity, 
subject to international privileges and obligations. This interpretation leads 
to difficulties in many instances. For example, what is the position of a 
government recognized by some states and not by others? We might be forced 
to say that an unrecognized government has no rights or duties. Actual expe­
rience has shown u s, however, that while non-recognition makes the enforce­
ment of rights and duties more difficult, governments do have a legal 
existence before recognition.
The second or declaratory school of thought (including writers such 
as Brierly and Briggs) holds that recognition does not bring a government into 
existence but merely acknowledges the fact of its existence. Recognition ack­
nowledges a hitherto uncertain fact and accepts the consequences of that 
acknowledgement. The granting of recognition does not affect the status of a 
government from which recognition has been withheld under international law. 
However, recognition is important in the domestic law of a state withholding 
it from another. If recognition is not present, a court in a non-recognizing 
country will not recognize the legality of the acts of the non-recognized 
government. Thus recognition here has a quasi-constitutive effect. Inter­
national law, however, cannot refuse to recognize a fait accompli.
The present condition of international law makes possible different 
views on the application of law to the same rea lities. All interpretations are
Sjjrierly, p . 130.
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not equally correct, but there is no authority to determine who is right and who 
is  not. However, certain criteria have been set down which are a guide to 
whether a state should be recognized or not. These are both positive and nega­
tive in nature. A government which is  in effective control of a certain area of 
territory and is  capable of maintaining that control is said to be worthy of 
recognition. It must be determined whether a government indeed can bind the 
state to its commitments. On the other hand, certain conditions are irrelevant 
in considering recognition. ’'What form of government a state should adopt and 
whether it should replace an existing government, are domestic matters with 
which other states are not concerned."4 On this same point, Brierly further 
states that "for the recognizing state it is  irrelevant that a new state may have 
come into existence by civil war, or that a government may be a revolutionary 
government .” 5
One over-riding consideration, however, places the finer points of 
international law in a secondary position. This aspect is  the fact that recog­
nition is  a political act. Paul Reuter has this to say about it:
recognition in international law is  not concerned with the relatively 
simple de facto situations of private life . To recognize a power 
(whether recognizing a state or recognizing a government) is always 
in some part a creative activity. Power rests on collective psycho­
logy* and to ’recognize’ from outside an internal situation as 
existing helps to make it become a reality. Where there are 
’situations’ of this importance and of this kind, one cannot simply 
say that recognition is a judicial act of a purely technical nature.6
Thus although recognition does not imply approval or disapproval of a
4B rierly, p . 129.
^Brierly, p . 139.
®Paul Reuter, International Institutions, trans. J .M . Chapman, 
(London: George Allen and Unwin L td ., 1958), p .97.
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governmental system  or the people composing a government, another state may 
withhold recognition because it dislikes that system . A government may choose 
to adhere to or ignore the particular facets of international law that are valid 
for the situation as best suits its political m otives. "It is a rule of Interna­
tional Law that no new state has a right as against other states to be recognized 
by them, and that no state has a duty to recognize a new state Each state is  
free to choose for itself whether or not to recognize a government and this 
choice is made usually on the basis of political self-interest. Recognition can 
thus be withheld to show disapproval or accorded to aid the stability of that 
government. The policy of President Wilson in Central America and of several 
nations in the present situation concerning Communist China illustrates that 
position. It might be added at this juncture that it is  difficult to maintain non­
recognition of a strong state.
Phillip Brown stresses the political nature of recognition even more
strongly. /
No branch of international law has been so badly misunderstood 
and needlessly confused as that of the recognition of new states 
and new governments. Recognition has been the football of 
diplomats who have made it mean anything that suited their 
purpose. It has certainly been grossly abused as a weapon of 
diplomatic pressure and intervention. 8
Later, in the same article Brown goes on to say;
Another basic principle is  the major premise that the function of 
recognition is  a voluntary, free, political, diplomatic function.
There is no supreme law, no legal compulsion to constrain any 
government to accord or refuse recognition. 9
7B riggs, p .78.
^Phillip M. Brown, "The Legal Effects of Recognition", American 
Journal of International Law, XLIV (October 1950), 617.
9Brown, p .619.
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5The whole sphere of recognition is obscured by political considerations. 
It is delayed, refused or granted for other than legal reasons., For example, 
we may consider the withholding of recognition of the Soviet Union by the West­
ern Powers after the revolution of 1917. Economic considerations were of the 
prime importance. Commercial agreements have the effect of a qualified recog­
nition and such agreements were in existence between the Soviet Union and such 
Western Powers as Great Britain and France. The United States while refus­
ing to recognize the Soviet Union still entered into direct negotiations with her 
and signed the Kellogg Pact of 1928 along with the Soviet Union.
These last remarks pose another question. How does one reconcile
non-recognition with co-membership in a pact or international body? The
method actually is  quite sim ple. A nation simply states that its action, v is-a -
v is the non-recognized government, does not imply recognition.
It has been generally held that the presence of non-recognized 
states and governments in the United Nations is to be regarded 
' as a special conventional arrangement that does not imply full 
recognition by other members. 10
In considering recognition, states are sometimes confronted with the 
problem of governments which seem  to be unwilling to fulfill their inter -  
national obligations. In such an eventuality should recognition be accorded?
The case of the Soviet Union which got recognition although it would not accept 
the general principles of international law seem s to indicate that non­
conformity to international law does not always rule out the possibility of recog­
nition. Soviet Russia was given the rights of international law (e .g . control 
over public property of the state in other states, not liable to law suits etc.) 
by those who accorded recognition but gave no indication of the intention to
■^Brown, p .621.
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respect the legal rights of others. This state of affairs seem s to point up the 
statement made above concerning the difficulty of failing to recognize a strong 
sta te . y
A government for various reasons may not want to extend complete 
recognition to a new government. It must, however, recognize that govern­
ment’s existence. To deny this is against common sen se . It is not a question 
of having relations, for relations must exist, but it is  a question of the nature 
and extent of these relations. Implied recognition is  more reasonably ex­
plained as merely the necessity of frankly admitting the existence of a de facto 
government. "It would seem clear that the recognition of a new government 
is  of much greater significance from the political point of view than from the 
lega l." 11 If one makes any kind of acknowledgement of the de facto situation, 
some type of commitment will have to result from the relations which do 
e x is t .
There is not unanimity among students of international law that recog­
nition is chiefly political. The strongest arguments for the legal nature of the 
act come from Professor Lauterpacht. Stated briefly his belief is that there 
are certain legal requirements that must be obtained by a government aspir­
ing to recognition. Once the requirements are satisfied, that government has 
a right to recognition and all others have the duty to recognize it . This theory, 
however, does not seem to be in tune with the realities of the international 
scene and has been c r it ic iz e d  on th e se  g rou n d s. In the w ords of J o s e f  L .
Kunz, "this assertion of a right to recognition and a duty to recognize, is  cer-
v 1f.
tainly untenable as not being in accord with positive international law ."12
11Brown, p .633.
12Josef L . Kunz, "Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht’s Recognition in 
International Law", American Journal of International Law, XLIV (October 
1950), 713.
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7There is a difference between the political and legal aspects of recog­
nition. The former is a strictly discretionary act of the state; the latter, a 
determination of whether certain requirements have been m et. Once the deter­
mination of requirements has been made, it does not follow necessarily that 
recognition will be accorded or denied.
Lauterpacht is criticized for seeming to be a wishful thinker. If 
recognition is  a purely political act, then that surely would be a defect in 
international law. Thus he sets out to prove the juridical nature of recognition. 
Being a member of the constitutive school of thought, Lauterpacht feels that an 
unrecognized state and its acts are nullities. His argument is  that if there is  
no duty to recognize a government, the whole problem of recognition passes out 
of the sphere of law. It would seem that on a purely speculative level, Lauter- 
pacht's views may have considerable m erit. They cannot, however, be accept­
ed in the light of the realities of international behaviour; e .g .  Chinese 
Communist intervention in Korea was by no means a nullity.
When a realization of this cardinal principle, that recognition is  pri­
marily a political act, is gained, it is  much easier to understand situations 
which on the surface seem  to be irreconcilable to fact, e .g .  recognizing the 
Nationalist government on Formosa as the government of all China. All con­
siderations and evaluations concerning recognition in this paper will be based 
on the political nature of the act.
2 . Sino-Canadian Relations
Sino-Canadian intercourse has never been very extensive.1** On the
■^Material in this section is based on G .P .d eT . Glazebrook, Canadian 
External Relations, (Toronto: Oxford U. P ress, 1950), and A .B .M .L ow er, 
Canada and the Far East 1940 (New York International Secretariat, Institute of 
Pacific Relations, 1940).
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political scene, it has not been necessary to enter into protracted negotiations 
on any matter. Canada has been represented in China since 1906 though at
that date the representation concerned matters of trade only. It was in that 
year that the first Commercial Office was opened in Shanghai. In 1909, Mr. 
Angus McLean became the first Canadian Trade Commissioner in China.
relations, that an amiable attitude has existed on both sides. Such rapport as 
existed was evidenced in the goodwill of the citizenry of both countries rather 
than in the governments. This attitude was best exemplified by Canadians in 
their support of China in her wars against Japan in 1931 and again in 1937. 
Sympathy was displayed for China in many Canadian quarters. Many organi­
zations tried to foster a boycott of Japanese trade.
many hundreds of Canadian mi ionaries representing several Christian deno­
minations were at work in China. The missionary effort was quite large con­
sidering the size of Canada. Although the number of converts was unimpres­
sive compared to the effort and expenditure put forth, the contribution in the 
form of universities, schools and hospitals was laudable. These concrete 
manifestations of help, along with the introduction of western culture instilled  
goodwill for Canada into the many Chinese who were affected. Probably the 
greatest boost in Sino-Canadian mutual goodwill was the sterling character 
and intellectual prowess of the m issionaries themselves who represented some 
of the finest elements of the Canadian population. Their influence upon govern­
ment must have counted for something. Chiang Kai-shek himself is a Christian. 
Even if the missionary effort was accepted as beneficial by most Chinese, and 
this is  debatable, it would not impress the Communists.
On the whole it may be said, despite the sparsity of Sino-Canadian
Probably the chief cause of Canadian goodwill towards China was that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
If the general attitude of the Canadian populace was warm towards 
China, the attitude of the Canadian government was at best luke-warm. During 
the Manchurian c r is is , Prime Minister Bennet said it was not wise to place 
blame anywhere since Canada knew little of the situation. China got no Canadian 
support at all since Canada wanted to retain Japanese friendship. The lead of 
the United Kingdom was followed and an arms embargo placed on both China 
and Japan in 1933. Later during the Sino-Japanese war, Canadian trade actually 
prospered because of that war and Canada did not overtly support China in the 
League of Nations.
The treatment of Chinese in Canada was not calculated to promote 
understanding. An early influx of Chinese into British Columbia aroused the 
white people of that area. Thus the government was prodded into passing dis­
criminatory legislation in the form of a poll tax on Chinese and finally in 1923 
the Chinese Immigration Act. This certainly could not have aroused anything 
but resentment among Chinese. The treatment often given visiting Chinese 
officials and distinguished people by immigration officials was again not calcu­
lated to foster amity. Chinese in British Columbia especially were denied 
civil rights, as they could not vote, hold office, etc . On the whole the treat­
ment of the Chinese as immigrants and citizens is  a rather shameful chapter 
in our history. "China has a standing grievance against Canada on account of 
the slight on her national honour
Sino-C anad ian  trad e  h a s  n ev er  been  of any great m agn itu d e. P r io r  
to World War I this trade was almost insignificant and imports to Canada 
exceeded her exports. After World War I imports and exports reached a peak
^ A .R .M . Lower, Canada and the Far East -  1940, (New York: 
International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p .80.
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in 1926. Exports were then substantially higher than imports and trade was of 
some significance. Ironically, British Columbia, and to a lesser  extent the 
P rairies, were the chief beneficiaries.
Finally, it must be noted that China, under Chiang Kai-shek was an 
ally against Japan in World War n. No one can deny the tenacity with which 
she fought nor ignore the privations which she suffered. Many Canadians do 
not wish to repay Chiang Kai-shek with a slap in the face for his valiant effort 
in the fight against J apan. ^
3 . Canadian Foreign Policy Goals 
Taking note of Canada's historical relations with China, one could 
easily  wonder what difference it made to Canada which government it recog­
nized as the government of China. It must be said that this question of 
recognition takes on significance only as an aspect of foreign policy in general 
and the objectives of that policy. The question of entering into relations with 
China so as to be able to transact business is  of little importance. As H .F . 
Angus pointed out, "But this was not an urgent reason for there was not much
business to transact and the friendly services of the other Commonwealth
16countries were available."
To attempt a discussion of Canadian foreign policy in a few brief para­
graphs seems almost fruitless considering the scope of that field . However, a 
resume of some of the more salient aspects of Canadian foreign policy will 
perhaps establish a frame of reference within which the more particular problem
*^A.R.M . Lower, Canada and the Far East -  1940, (New York: Inter­
national Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p .80.
1 6 H .F . Angus, Canada and the Far East, 1940-1953, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press [under auspices of the Canadian Institute of Inter­
national Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations^ , 1953), p .36.
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of recognition of Communist China may be better evaluated. The first aim of 
any government in foreign policy is national self-interest and security. It is  
not necessary to quote statesmen to prove that th is,is as true of Canada as of 
any other country. Ordinarily a question of recognition of a new government 
would not be considered a matter vitally concerning national self-interest or 
security. This is not the case in respect of Communist China. Many possible 
ramifications which might stem from such recognition must be weighed.
It is also possible to state without fear of being challenged in other 
than Communist countries, that along with promoting national self-interest and 
security, world order and peace form the cornerstone of Canadian foreign 
policy. The quest for peace indeed encompasses national self-interest and 
security and is at one with these objectives. Thus one must ask himself what 
recognition will do to foster or disrupt the chances for peace.
The maintenance of a high level of friendship and co-operation in 
Canadian-American relations is a vital, if not the most vital, component of 
Canadian foreign policy. Not only is the United States our best customer, but 
she looks to Canada for support in all her undertakings in foreign policy. The 
United States on its part is remarkably willing to be conciliatory in her deal­
ings with Canada. This situation is considered excellent by many Canadians 
who feel it gives to Canada a chance to temper American policy with the 
Canadian attitude at certain tim es. This is important for the whole Western 
a llia n c e  with w hich Canada m ust e ith e r  s in k  or sw im  and w hich i s  led  by our 
great neighbour. "And all Canadian foreign policy is  subject to the over­
riding need to maintain the Western alliance led by the United States."^-®
^M ichael Barkway, "All Right, What Is Our Foreign Policy?", 
Saturday Night, (May 8, 1951), p .8.
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Canada must be wary of the effect her recognition of Communist China may 
have on the United States in view of the adamant position among most of its 
populace and officials against such recognition.
Recognition must also be considered in the light of Commonwealth 
relations. Policy-makers must ask themselves if recognition will strengthen 
harmony within the Commonwealth. The existing situation in which some 
Commonwealth members recognize Communist China while others do not, 
makes the decision even more complex.
Finally any decision on recognition must take into consideration the 
effect that decision will have on Canada's self proclaimed role as one of the 
leaders of the so-called Middle Pow ers. In direct connection with this the 
reaction of the Afro-Asian nations must be gauged correctly in order to make 
the proper decision regarding recognition. It is  not over-emphasizing the 
importance of the problem of recognition of Communist China to call it a 
major foreign policy decision.
To achieve its purpose this thesis must investigate the problem of 
recognition of Communist China in the light of conditions at home and abroad 
in the 1949-60 period.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 1
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM
No Canadian government or opposition party could frame a policy on 
recognition of Red China without regard to the relationship such a policy 
would bear to the general picture of world conditions. If the decision were to 
be based on legal considerations then one could agree that the proper course 
of action would have to be followed without taking note of the strategic impli­
cations of the move. However, when the problem is  considered to be prima­
rily  political it must be admitted that any solution must take cognizance of 
the effects the policy will have on the world situation in general or on specific 
Canadian foreign or domestic interests. For this reason it is  felt that a des­
cription of the salient factors on the Canadian foreign and domestic political 
scenes from 1949 to 1960 is necessary to enable the reader to gain a better 
perspective of what is involved in the recognition of Red China. -
1. General Political Conditions 1949 
The Central Government of the People's Republic of China was pro­
claimed in Peking on October 1, 1949. This government invited recognition 
on the basis of equality, friendship, respect for territorial integrity and with­
drawal of recognition from the Nationalist government. Thus the question of 
whether to recognize the new government was first posed to the Liberal admini­
stration then in power in Canada.
It could be seen immediately that this matter would be more than just
13
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one of a routine extension of recognition. It would be considered as a move in 
the cold war and as such could not be taken lightly. Thus the effect that recog­
nition of Red China would have on the Western position via-a-vis the Commu­
nists came to be a major determinant of the policy of all Canadian political 
parties although it will be seen later that the possible effects were interpreted 
differently.
Communism had been checked in Europe by the creation of N .A .T .O . 
However, events in Europe were still of prime importance as the emphasis on 
Asia had not taken on the urgency so evident in later years. Chinese communism  
was not looked upon as the same as that of Eastern Europe which had been insti­
tuted by force of Russian arm s. Indeed, some C .C .F . members1 believed 
that the revolution in China was in large measure the result of agrarian discon­
tent. This in itself prompted many of them to support recognition. Again in - 
A sia, the Communist guerilla fighters in the Phillipines and Malaya were being 
dealt with satisfactorily although they still constituted a threat especially in the 
latter country. The importance of China as a base of Communist operations 
was realized but China was not considered strong enough at the time to pose a 
real threat to the configuration of states- in South East A sia. However the evalu­
ation of the Chinese danger to South East Asia soon changed especially because 
of her aid to the Viet Minh forces of North Viet-Nam in the French Indo-China 
conflict.
V ic to ry  in China w as c e r ta in ly  the m ost im portant step  forw ard fo r  the  
Communists in A sia. The question Canadian policy makers had to decide with 
regard to recognizing Red China was whether recognition would augment that
^ e e  the statement of Mr. Stewart on p . 58.
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victory or non-recognition might somehow detract from it . It could also be 
conjectured that recognition might help win over the Chinese from the 
Communist camp while non-recognition would further alienate them from the 
W est. It can be seen that the situation left many avenues for speculation and 
most have been explored at one time or another.
By early 1950, Britain and India had recognized Red China. Thus 
two countries with which Canada has very close ties had taken the step which 
Canada was only contemplating. The Canadian populace included many tradi­
tionalists who still clung to the view that Britain’s foreign policy should form 
the criterion that Canada must follow in external affairs. Was this to be so 
with regard to recognition of Communist China? In the case of India one 
witnessed the leading country of free Asia recognizing Peking. Both Britain 
and India were Commonwealth partners of Canada and this tended to compound 
the dilemma.
The advantage of presenting a common Commonwealth front in foreign 
affairs was realized by the Canadian government. On the other hand Canada, 
like her sister Commonwealth states, had her own special problems and could 
not automatically follow the Commonwealth lead. Mr. Pearson, the Canadian 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, attended a Commonwealth Conference 
of Foreign Ministers at Columbo, Ceylon in January, 1950. This afforded 
him the opportunity of learning first hand the positions of countries which had 
recognized Red China. By that time four Commonwealth members, Britain, 
Ceylon, India and Pakistan, had accorded recognition to the Peking regim e.
Canada’s position of membership in both N .A .T .O . and the Common­
wealth presented problems. On one hand she could not afford to do anything 
to enhance Communism but on the other she wished to be in a position of
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leadership among the so-called Middle Powers of which India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon were important examples. Thus the position of Asian Commonwealth 
members on recognition must have seemed enticing as a means to gain 
broader popularity for Canada in that area.
In contrast the position of the United States provided a restraint on 
recognition of Peking by Canada. President Truman had announced that the 
United States would not aid in the defence of Formosa. This touched off a 
furious debate in the United States where the loudest outcry came from the 
Republicans led by Senator Knowland and General Douglad MacArthur who 
argued that defence considerations demanded the maintenance of Formosa as 
a base for the containment of Communism and protection of the W est. Defence 
of Formosa naturally precluded recognition of the Peking regime which
O
claimed that island.
Canada was then caught in a position where she had to choose sides
between her two closest a llies.
Ottawa would have to decide whether to move forward in accepting 
what appeared to London to be the facts and necessities of the 
case, or to refuse recognition on the divergent reading of 
Washington. ^
It is  little wonder that Mr. Pearson called for a cautious policy. China was a 
testing ground for Communism in Asia and conditions in that part of the world 
could change rapidly.
In Canada itself the question of recognition of Communist China seemed 
almost academic. Diplomatic recognition is accorded so that contact is avail­
able to transact business, commercial or otherwise. "But this was not an
^W .E.C. Harrison, Canada in World Affairs, 1949-50, (Toronto: 
Oxford University P ress , 1957), pp.245-246.
3Harrison, p . 167.
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urgent reason for there was not much business to transact and the friendly
did not have to consider recognition as an expedient for protecting commercial 
interests as Britain had been forced to do. At that time Canada was in a 
period of great prosperity and trade was booming. While few would discount 
the advantage of gaining Chinese markets, Canada was well enough off for 
large numbers of people to say that we should not sacrifice principles for trade. 
On the other hand those calling for increased Chinese trade did not have an 
urgent economic condition to underline their demands.
assumed a new perspective. Red Chinese intervention in that war, in October 
1950, showed conclusively that Peking did indeed pose a military threat in
which was overly hostile to Canada. The immediate reaction was to make 
recognition of the Peking regime impossible while the war was on. All parties 
concurred in that belief. Recognition at that time would have been particu­
larly unpopular, both in the United States and Canada.
to the question of which group would sit in the Chinese seat at the United 
Nations. On September 19, 1950, the Indian delegation introduced a resolution 
to seat Red China. It was argued in the United Nations that solutions to far 
Eastern problems would be facilitated by the adoption of the resolution. It
4
services of other Commonwealth countries were available.'* Thus, Canada
2. Chinese Aggression and its Aftermath 
With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 the problem
China. The situation now called for a decision on recognizing a government
At that time recognition of Red China was becoming more closely tied
^H .F. Angus, Canada and the Far East 1940-1953, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto P ress, 1953), p .36.
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would be better to have diverse opinions stated from within the United Nations 
rather than outside it. It was difficult for non-recognizing nations to acquiesce 
with the North Koreans committing aggression concurrently. Canada abstained 
from voting on the resolution and introduced her own resolution suggesting that 
a special committee study the problem. Abstention on the Indian measure could 
be interpreted to indicate that Canada had no active objection to seating Com­
munist China. More likely Canada was loath to vote against an Indian resolu­
tion on the grounds that such action might alienate India to some extent. For 
Canada there could be no thought of Red Chinese entry into the United Nations
/
before the Korean situation was in some way ameliorated.
In June and July of 1951, truce talks in Korea were undertaken.
This heralded the cessation of hostilities and hopes for a peaceful denouement 
to Far Eastern problems were engendered. Recognition of the Peking regime 
came to be associated with the search for peace. The Red Chinese had been 
branded aggressors and a suitable Korean settlement seemed mandatory if  
that stigma was to be lifted. Until such time as Red China had helped to solve 
the problems she had caused, many felt recognition would be premature.
Formosa also came to be considered more urgently. It had been 
neutralized by the presence of United States naval units in the Straits of Formosa. 
Both Chinese governments claimed that Formosa was part of China. The Com­
munists felt that recognition by another country must entail support of their 
claim to Formosa if Peking was to reciprocate. This clearly could not be a 
condition of Canadian recognition of the mainland government. The problem 
then of finding an amicable settlement was extremely difficult and indeed is no 
closer to a solution at present.
American opinion on recognition had been made even more unyielding
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
by the Korean War. The faction led by Senator Knowland was outraged by even 
the consideration of such a policy. A rift in Angle-American relations had 
occurred because of the British recognition. The prospect of strained 
Canadian-American relations was not a happy one and therefore Canadian 
policy-makers had to understand the American attitude.
As in Canada, many in the United States before the Korean War had 
been favourably disposed towards recognizing the Peking regime as the lawful 
government of China. Had the Korean War not occurred recognition might 
have been extended and the Anglo-American cleavage would not have developed. 
The effects of American recognition would have been far-reaching. Canada 
and many other states would have followed the American lead. The Commun­
ist regime would have had the right to represent China in international organi­
zations and would have had claim to all Chinese public property, bank 
balances, ships, planes etc. that were held by the Nationalist government.
The Nationalist government of course would have no longer been recognized as 
the government of China and Formosa would have come under Chinese autho­
rity as agreed at Cairo in 1943. Peking would have replaced the Nationalist 
Chinese on the Security Council at the United Nations.
Red China’s aggression in Korea, however, ended such speculation 
and hardened American opinion against recognition. By 1953-54 the United 
States was committed to use the veto in the Security Council against Red China’s 
bid to enter. If Red China was accepted into the United Nations, Senator 
Knowland of the United States had vowed to introduce a resolution in the Senate 
to withdraw the United States from the United Nations. What merit was there 
in the American attitude? It was true that no doubt existed as to who controlled 
the mainland but it had been proven that Peking had not shown any willingness
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to act as a responsible world citizen. The British experience provided proof 
that recognition had not achieved any useful diplomatic results. By her failure 
to be a good world citizen, Red China provided the United States with some 
legal footing on which to base her purely political view of recognition. Recog­
nition might still have come when the world situation became less  tense and 
the new government began to show signs of accepting the international status- 
quo, with its accompanying obligations, as the case had been with the Soviet 
Union. The need for negotiations had led to a quasi-recognition already, as 
evidenced by the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw in 1955.
Still the question had not been answered as to what the United States would do - 
if  a Korean settlement was concluded.
The French failure to repulse the Communists in Indo-China ended 
with the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954, and set the stage for 
the Geneva Conference of 1954. At these discussions Red China came to con­
front the Western Powers who had been forced to deal with her. To many,
(e .g .  C .C .F . in Canada), this implied a tacit admission of recognition. At
i
any rate the situation had been reached where there was no alternative but to 
enter into discussions with the Peking regim e.
It was hoped that at Geneva the groundwork would be laid for the 
future eradication of tension in the Far East. This atmosphere of hope may 
have well given rise to a feeling that perhaps recognition might provide yet 
another step to establish a lasting peace. The C .C .F . certainly felt that recog­
nition would aid discussions with Red China.
After Geneva and moving into the later years of the 1950's the pockets 
of tension in the world shifted to the Middle East and Africa. This led to a 
lessening of the immediate urgency of recognition of Red China by Canada.
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3. Economic Problems and Their Effect on the Question 
Between the Conservative election victory of June 1957 and 1960 
there was a decline in the tempo of Canadian economic growth with the result­
ant effects on employment and general properity. In such circumstances the 
necessity of expanding trade to further economic recovery became more 
p ressin g .4 The huge market potential of China was indeed inviting for Canadian 
exporters. Thus the claim that recognition would lead to greater Sino- 
Canadian trade took on added significance.
Points of serious friction in Asia which had existed a few years pre­
viously were far le ss  volatile in the late 1950's, and the argument of the need 
for recognition to facilitate negotiations lost much of its former urgency. In 
these circumstances the problem could settle into a discussion of what was to 
be gained or lost by recognition, based generally on pragmatic grounds. Trade 
and the possibilities of furthering it thus came out as a very important element 
in the discussion. ■ *
With the shift in the area of greatest world tension away from the Far 
Eastern area temporarily, Canada's relationship with China could be con­
sidered with a le ss  emotional approach. A purely economic approach seemed 
a wise one to some elements especially in British Columbia which stood to 
benefit most by trade. In any event the call for increased trade with Red 
China certainly would find a better reception in a period of unemployment and 
recession than it would have in previous years of record prosperity.
In addition to this the period after the Conservative victory of 1957 
showed some tendency to a greater nationalist feeling. This feeling reacted 
against the purported American domination of Canadian foreign policy. The 
position of Canada with regard to Red China was considered a prime example
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of this supposed American interference. Recognition then could be accorded 
and thus Canadian independence in foreign policy would have been asserted. 
Perhaps the feeling of nationalism could also in part be attributed to economic 
distress as there may have been a tendency to blame the United States for 
essentially Canadian problems.
The shift in emphasis in foreign affairs, however, lessened the im ­
portance of recognition as a factor in total Canadian foreign policy. Trade 
could then assume a greater importance since arguments which claimed that 
dealing with Red China represented an abdication of principles carries le ss  
weight when no current situations were coming to a head in the Far E ast. In 
general, under the Conservative administration the problem of recognition 
never assumed the importance it sometimes attained in previous y ears.
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THE LIBERAL POSITION
1. The Liberals in Power
From the inception of Communist China to June of 1957 the Liberal 
party formed the government of Canada. Lester B . Pearson carried the 
external affairs portfolio in that administration. He was therefore the man 
responsible for the policy of non-recognition of Red China which was main­
tained during that period. His considerations of the question as they can be 
interpreted from public statements he made, clearly show that Pearson viewed 
the issue as a political rather than a legal matter.
In the first statement on this issue that Pearson made to the House of 
Commons (on October 25, 1949), he stated that the government would view 
recognition in the light of international law. The criteria for recognition 
would be independence for foreign control, effective control over the territory 
and a well defined territory. If these requirements were met consideration 
should be given to recognition. * The implication was clear that should Red 
China fulfill the demands of international law she would be entitled to consi­
deration for recognition but not necessarily recognition itself. If recognition 
were a legal problem then a situation in which a government conforms to inter­
national law would surely lead directly to recognition. Since, however, 
Pearson said that consideration of recognition would follow from fulfillment
■^Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of 
Debates (Hereafter referred to as Debates). October 25, 1949, p. 1109.
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of certain requirements it must be deduced that legal considerations are only 
pre-requisites for a question of recognition to merit investigation. The final 
disposition of the problem would depend on other factors which are political 
in nature.
When the issue of recognition is  placed in a political framework its 
disposition becomes the result of subjective evaluations rather than an objec­
tive judicial decision. Thus Pearson had to weigh carefully the possible rami­
fications of a verdict in either direction. It was clear that Canadians were 
strong in their condemnation of communism but could this be used as an 
excuse to ignore the controlling influence that the Peking regime had over 
450 million Chinese? Pearson certainly did not want to adopt any stance 
which could be construed as approving of communism. Thus he strongly 
denied that recognition implied anything more than an acknowledgement of an 
existing government.
if  the fact of communist control of China is confirmed and an 
independent -  I stress the word 'independent' -  Chinese govern­
ment, able to discharge its international obligations is  
established and accepted by the Chinese people, then in due 
course and after consultation with other friendly governments, 
we will have to recognize the facts which confront us. If we 
indicate in the future, recognition of the Chinese government, 
that will not indicate any approval of communism in China 
any more than our recognition of the communist states of 
Eastern Europe indicates approval of their form of government.
It however should help maintain the contact between the Canadian 
and Chinese peoples which I have mentioned.2
Government policy was non-committal as it assumed a wait-and-see 
attitude. The lack of unanimity in policy among Canada's a llies, the uncer­
tainty of how conditions would turn out in the Far East and the absence of any 
pressing business to pursue with China all led to a cautious approach to the
2Pebates. November 16, 1949, p. 1838.
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m atter. The government was caught between two directly opposed views on 
recognition embodied in the Conservative and C .C .F . parties and their cautious 
approach satisfied neither. The C .C .F . which advocated recognition chastised 
the government for withholding it while the Conservatives on the other hand com­
plained of indications that the Liberal government favoured recognition.
Pearson seemed more disposed, however, to defend the government 
against Conservative remarks than against C .C .F . allegations. He reviewed 
some of the legal pre-requisites for recognition and asserted that de facto and 
de jure recognition had to be distinguished. Recognition and diplomatic repre­
sentation were not synonmyous he added. One had also to discern whether a 
government's authority was being challenged or if it was in complete control. 
Pearson argued that these conditions as described by international law were 
never meant to be rigid and without exception. For instance a government’s 
acceptance by the people is  not necessarily evidenced by freely expressed  
popular approval. Resistance of the people to the new government or support 
of movements against the government can be termed indicative of approval by 
the people. In this respect it seems that Pearson might have been intimating 
that the Communist victory over the Nationalists and the lack of any wide­
spread revolt in China against the new regime implied that the majority of the 
Chinese populace accepted the Peking government.^
To charges that recognition would endanger Viet-Nam, Pearson 
answered that Britain, India and Pakistan had recognized Red China and no 
evidence proved that their actions had caused the situation to deteriorate in 
Viet-Nam. He further stated that Soviet boycotting tactics in the United Nations 
would not intimidate Canada into a decision favouring Peking. However,
^Debates, March 7, 1950, p .516.
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the situation in the United Nations which saw a growing number of member 
states which recognized Red China posed a perplexing question,^ What would 
Canada do if she were to find herself in an organization in which a majority of 
states had recognized Red China? If Red China were to sit in the same body 
as Canada, Pearson felt it impossible to walk out in emulation of the Soviet 
tactics but to remain and work with Peking's representatives would be a form 
of recognition.
In early 1950 the government policy was still one of non-recognition 
but not violently so . It was a cautious appraisal of the situation and the posi­
tion the government was in could shift either way. No definitive statements 
had been made, the need to consult with allies and in general the importance 
of making any decision, Canadians would regret was stressed .
At this point one might question the necessity of exercising caution 
in the rendering to a government its legal right to be recognized or carrying 
out the obligation to recognize. That the government of the day exercised  
such caution indicated that it believed no such rights or obligations existed. 
Caution was necessary due to the political implications of the problem.
The official government policy was non-recognition coupled with a 
constant review of the case but within the Liberal party one could discern 
support of recognition. H .A . Mackenzie (Lamton-Kent) was an outspoken ad­
vocate of recognition. He had served with a U .N . relief organization in China 
and could testify to the corruptness of the Nationalist government. The lack 
of democracy in that country he felt had doomed the old system to disaster.
In his opinion the Chinese were not particularly pro-Russian and thus there
^Debates, March 7, 1950, p .516.
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was no cause to suppose a permanent Sino-Soviet accord. Canada thus would 
be best served by recognizing Red China in order to prevent her from being
5
driven into the arms of Soviet Russia.
The Korean War ended the possibility of recognition for the time
being. "There can be no question even of considering it while the Chinese
6defy the United Nations in Korea and fights our forces there." Even before 
the Chinese Communists actively entered the war it seemed evident that they 
approved and supported the North Korean aggression. Under these conditions 
the arguments against recognition seemed to carry more weight. For instance 
it could be seen that Britain had received little as a result of recognition. 
Peking had not even deigned to exchange envoys.
Pearson admitted that recognition of Red China would help in reach­
ing solutions to Far-Eastern problems but added that this was incompatible 
with the Chinese position in Korea:
' I feel however that the Far Eastern problems could be more 
easily solved if  diplomatic relations existed with the government 
of China which has the whole of the mainland under its control.
But the Peking government can hardly expect recognition now 
from those member states of the United Nations whom they are 
fighting in Korea. The remedy for the situation now lies with 
the communists them selves. They should not think they can 
bludgeon or blackmail their way into recognition or into the 
United Nations. 7
Again it was the pressure of political events that prevented Canadian 
recognition. The legal considerations had not been altered by the Korean con­
flict yet recognition which could be considered before the war was thought to
^Debates, pp. 1875-79.
6L .B . Pearson, statement of May 7, 1951 quoted from External 
Affairs, June 1951, p .203.
7
Debates, February 2 , 1951, p .55.
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be an impossible policy during the war. This is  still further proof that the 
legal factors in the issue were of secondary importance to the over-riding 
political circum stances.
The apparent lo g ic  o f m any argum en ts in  favour of reco g n itio n  w ere  
offset by the predictability of certain adverse results which would arise from  
recognition. Thus while one side was saying it was absurd to regard Chiang 
Kai-shek as the spokesman for the Chinese people the other side maintained 
that it was not in Canada's best interests to strain relations with the United 
States (a certain result of recognition) even if recognition did seem the wisest 
course to follow. In the light of this it is  not hard to understand the ambiva­
lent attitude exhibited by the government. Its policy was non-recognition but 
Pearson often seemed to favour the opposite approach.
What was needed the government maintained was an attitude of open 
mindedness. A rigid outlook would not be correct, and to say that recognition 
should never be accorded was folly. Pearson's experience in the field of 
diplomacy had taught him that bargaining could not be successful if  either side 
begins negotiations with an inflexible attitude. This caused him to reject the 
idea set forth by Mr. Green (Vancouver-Quadra), a Conservative foreign 
affairs cr it ic , that the West make it clear that Formosa could never be handed 
over to the Red Chinese. No avenue of discussion regarding Formosa or any 
other aspect of the recognition problem should be closed off.
Among the supporters of recognition both within and without the admini­
stration there was a feeling that no matter what situation existed on the main­
land there was little support for the Nationalist regim e. Any move to re-instate 
Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland would do great harm to Western prestige in 
A sia. It was also agreed that it was through the Nationalists' own failings,
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rather than any lack of support from or betrayal by the United States, that the
Communists achieved their victory on mainland China. Western intervention
in China was looked on as a dangerous policy because in Mackenzie's words;
by associating counter-revolution, which can develop indigenously, 
as the whole history of China shows, with foreign intervention and 
foreign assistance we may strengthen rather than weaken communist 
reg im es.8
A consideration that had to be borne in mind by the government was 
that Canada's decision with regard to Red China was of little consequence when 
considered in isolation. It was only when the Canadian decision on recognition 
was looked upon as a political move of an important member of the Western 
alliance that the significance of the matter could be fully appreciated. It was 
in this context that the issue had to be deliberated.
Another possibility, that of exercising our influence on the United 
States by taking the lead in recognizing Red China, found some support in 
Canada.
Perhaps the most valuable Canadian contribution will be a point 
of view, a healthy detachment, untrammelled by strong domestic 
feeling or vital overseas territorial and economic interests, a 
detachment and candour that tries to balance political and legal 
realities with the strategic requirements of the free world in 
the Pacific and the need for some brake on aggressive Chinese 
Communism in A sia .9
Such a position was probably quite similar to the views of Pearson.
The Liberal position of maintaining non-recognition as a policy but at
the sam e tim e  adm itting  that it  m ight aid  w orld  p ea ce  cau sed  th em  to  be the
target of both Conservatives and the C .C .F . The former charged that the
8Pebates, January 29, 1954, p . 1590.
9Maxwell Cohen, "Communist China -  To recognize or not to recognize" 
International Journal, VIII (Autumn, 1953), 271.
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government was about to embark on a dangerous and detrimental policy while 
the latter complained that the administration had admitted the value of recog­
nition but did not have the courage to carry out that policy. Statements by the 
government did little to calm the storm.
A prime example of the government's stand can be seen from state­
ments made by Prime Minister S t. Laurent during and after his world tour of 
1954. It was alleged that he had said that the Chinese people accepted the 
Communist governm ent.^ There was an uproar over that comment and the 
Prim e Minister apologized for making the wrong choice of words and giving 
that impression. However, he added that Western countries would sooner or 
later have to recognize and deal with the effective government of China. Such 
recognition would not necessarily be diplomatic in nature but might be a 
change from the attitude of ignoring Communist China. The results of the 
Geneva Conference and the views of Canada's allies would have to be weighed 
but a position that recognition would never be extended could not be taken. 
Communist Chinese presence at Geneva did not indicate recognition but only a 
cognizance of the power controlling the mainland. As long as the Peking 
regime controlled China that group had to be included in vital discussions.
Even though he saw the necessity of negotiating with the Red Chinese 
the Prime Minister asserted that: "under present conditions I do not see any 
reason why we should consider diplomatic recognition of China."11 Dislike 
of a government, however, could not be a permanent roadblock against recog­
nition . An open mind had to be kept in regard to future contingencies. Thus 
the government and its Liberal supporters felt it was folly to compare talking
10"About Recognizing China", editorial, Ottawa Journal, March 12,1954.
11Debates , March 25, 1954, p .3334.
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with the Chinese Communists at Geneva to the flight of Chamberlain to Munich
12as had been done by the Conservatives.
"Legal recognition is  something you give for your own national advan­
tage in your own national interests, which includes as the most important objec-
13tive of all, maintaining and strengthening the peace." That statement by 
Pearson leaves no doubt that he considered the problem a purely political one.
An implication that can be derived from that statement as w ell, is  that recog­
nition would be a good policy even if it benefited the Communists as long as it 
benefited Canada to a greater degree. Pearson was seemingly moving closer  
to recognition while denying that such a move was imminent. His statements 
indicated that any movement toward resolving Far Eastern problems would 
cause a reconsideration of the Canadian position.
It became more evident that Pearson would have liked to discover a 
way to extend recognition to China. In various speeches14 he repeated that, 
should Red China show a spirit of cooperation, Canada should consider recog­
nition .
Certainly the absence from negotiations and discussions at the 
United Nations or elsewhere of the de facto power on the Chinese 
mainland makes im possible, without the consent of the regim e, 
the effective settlement of disputed matters around that country's 
periphery: Korea, Formosa or Indo-China.15
The major drawback of course was finding a way to recognize Peking without
^ Debates, March 26, 1954, p .3386.
-^Debates, March 30, 1954, p .3544.
14e .g .  In the second of his Stafford Little Lectures at Princeton 
University in April 1955; in a speech to the Women’s Canadian Club of Vancouver 
in August 1955.
15L .B . Pearson quoted by D.C . M asters, Canada in World Affairs 
1953-55, (Toronto: Oxford University P ress , 1959), p .113.
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precipitating a major rift with the United States.
To avoid friction with one's closest ally was a concept readily under­
stood by Pearson. Thus it was a matter of prudence rather than subservience 
which caused Canada to defer to the United States on this issu e. Editorial com­
ment, however, was more prone to take note of the purported barrier to
1 fiCanadian independence of action. Perhaps it was this type of pressure plus 
his own predilections which prompted Pearson to sound out American opinion.
In the Stafford Little lectures referred to above (p. 40) he made a 
first effort at convincing the Americans that recognition after all was not such 
a bad idea. More specifically he wrote in an article in Look magazine that 
the West could negotiate with Peking when necessary without approving of the 
regime or weakening our position against communism. At that time he was 
trying to impress Dulles and Eisenhower with the logic of recognition. How­
ever an election year in the United States (1956) was not an apt one to ask an 
American administration to make such a controversial decision. Thus Canada 
was informed quite strongly at the White Sulphur Springs conference in April
1956 that recognition was out of the question. Pearson later admitted that the
18issue was not worth causing a first class row with the United States.
A domestic situation of some political significance also had an
■^Blair Frazer, "Will we play me too China?" Macleans (October 24, 
1955), p .6.
Kenneth McNaught, "Parliamentary Control of Foreign Policy?"
International Journal, (Autumn, 1956), p .259.
1 7L .B . Pearson, "Some Blunt Words from a Good Neighbour" Look 
(January 10, 1956), pp.62-63.
*®A tape recorded interview of L .B . Pearson by B . Frazer and 
L . Shapiro. Macleans, (July 6, 1957), p .52.
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important bearing on the deliberations concerning recognition.
The recognition of Communist China, for example, was strongly 
distasteful to most French-speaking Canadians who exhibited on 
this issue a more solidly united opinion than was evident elsewhere 
in the nation. 19
It was quite possible that Pearson could not have won a Cabinet argument over 
recognition because of opposition from Quebec. In their opposition to recog­
nition, the French-Canadians were joined by Eastern-European immigrants 
and others who found special cause for grievances against the Communists. 
That Pearson went ahead and intimated support of recognition may indicate 
that he felt capable of coping with these domestic political factors.
From all available evidence, one would have to conclude that it was 
the position of the United States that influenced Canada not to accord recogni­
tion. This could by no means be considered a legal consideration but was of 
course purely political. Coupled with this was the amount of opposition in 
Canada to recognition and the political strength of that opposition. That the 
government did not accord recognition despite its own feelings about the merits 
of such a policy and the pressure from many quarters in favour of recognition, 
indicates that the problem was not considered important enough to risk tension 
with the United States or political repercussions in Canada. There were no 
impelling reasons to accord recognition. Hopes for trade were not strong nor 
were the needs for diplomatic contact important, as they were provided by 
our Commonwealth partners. No obstacles prevented Canadians from travel­
ling in China and thus many journalists and businessmen did so . Even the 
Minister of F isheries, Mr. James Sinclair, visited China without upsetting
^Jam es Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs October 1955 to June 1957, 
(Toronto: Oxford University P ress, 1959), p. 15.
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the policy of non-recognition. In short the responsible policy-makers of the 
time did not feel it politically advantageous to accord recognition to the Peking 
regime at that time and therefore recognition was not accorded.
2. The Liberal Position as an Opposition Party 
The Liberal party, and especially its leader, Mr. Pearson, who had 
framed the foreign policy of the previous administration, found themselves in 
an uncomfortable situation as the Opposition. Their position had been that 
recognition was a good idea but not important enough to create a rift with the 
United States . Now that they were out of power it might have been expected 
that their views could be a little less restricted since they would not be trans­
lated into official policy. The drawback was that if they had advocated recog­
nition they would have been faced with the question of why they had not 
accorded it in the period 1949-1957. Still without being so bold as to say it 
openly, Mr. Pearson certainly gave the impression of favouring early re­
cognition. He asked how long we could support United States position that 
United Nations membership for Red China should not even be discussed. 
Besides that, could we really expect Peking to accept disarmament with con­
trol and inspection while still not recognized diplomatically by many nations 
within the U .N . ? The argument that we would be abandoning Asia to commun­
ism  lost its force when it was seen that most Asian countries recognized 
Peking. Recognition would have been pointless and worse than useless if  we 
did not support the Red Chinese claim for a United Nations seat. It was the 
ambiguous position of the United Kingdom in this respect which had cost her 
any chance of benefiting for the recognition she had extended. Recognition 
might not increase trade as much as many expected but Canada could not 
expect trade to expand as much without recognition.
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Out of his appraisal of the situation, Mr. Pearson came up with the
following suggestions. A trade mission should be sent to China to explore the
possibilities of sa les . Recognition or not, Formosa should not be handed over
. to China before the people of Formosa had a chance at self-determination.
This was not the same as a "Two China" policy since that was unacceptable to
both Chinese governments but Canada could not hand over the Formosans to
Peking against their w ill. The United States should be persuaded to have the
Nationalists evacuate the offshore islands. The maintenance of large numbers
of troops on these islands seemed to constitute a threat to the mainland and to
remove that threat would quiet the situation in the Formosan straits. Lastly,
he said that we should work out a common policy with other non-recognizing
countries. A time for decision might be drawing close and we should have
90worked towards a better position for making our choice.
In summing up the Liberal record on the subject of recognition of 
Communist China, one cannot fail to notice that political considerations were 
all important in framing policy. Legal arguments were only pre-requisites for 
making the problem worthy of attention. That is ,  certain legal requirements 
had to be attained before the political criteria for recognition would be applied 
to the issue . Mr. Pearson as chief foreign policymaker of the Liberal regime 
was cognizant of the fact that it was not the legal rights of China nor the legal 
duties of Canada that were involved in this issue but rather the national se lf-  
interest of Canada which was preponderant.
2°Debates, February 26, 1959, pp .1413-1415.
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IV
THE CONSERVATIVE OUTLOOK
From 1949 to 1957, the Conservative party formed the official oppo­
sition. In June of 1957 the federal elections brought them into power which 
they maintained for the duration of the period under consideration in this 
paper. To discover the motives which led to the Conservative policy on re­
cognition of Communist China will be the purpose of this chapter. A study of 
these motives and the policy which they generated will show that political 
factors most influenced the Conservatives in framing a stand on the question 
of recognition.
The Social Credit viewpoint is  also included in this chapter. This 
party had an outlook which was sim ilar to the Conservatives in many ways.
It will be seen that the Social Credit party also based its views about recog­
nition on political arguments.
1. The Conservatives in Opposition
From the very outset the Conservative party opposed the recognition 
of Red China. Basic to this policy was the view that Canada could in no way 
countenance the ideology of the Peking regim e. Following from this it was 
evident that no move should be undertaken that would in any way enhance the 
spread of communism. Recognition, the Conservatives felt, would aid the 
Chinese Communist in spreading their influence in Asia.
Due to the non-committal policy of the government the Conservatives
(who were the official opposition party) seemed in no hurry to make definitive
36
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statements in the months immediately following the creation of Red China.
They were waiting in hopes of finding an issue on which to pillory the govern­
ment. Accordingly, Mr. Flemming questioned Pearson, in the Committee on 
External Affairs, as to whether Parliament would be consulted before a deci­
sion was made
George Drew, leader of the official opposition, tried at first to prove 
that under the principles of international law, Red China was not entitled to 
recognition. He leaned heavily on quotations from Lauterpacht to lend credence 
to this view but showed no inclination to follow Lauterpacht's theories com­
pletely. It was argued that consent of the population of the state to the govern­
ment seeking recognition must be present to warrant such action. Spain, 
which was kept out of the United Nations because Franco was not representa­
tive of the people, was cited as an example. Furthermore, he considered that 
the action of the United Nations in that case had become part of international 
law. '
Having made this attempt at marshalling legal arguments in defence
of a policy of non-recognition, Drew moved to safer ground by outlining the
political drawbacks of recognition.
This is  not only a question of the formality of recognition; this 
is  not only a question of what recognition means to u s . It is a 
question of what recognition means to the Chinese, to the 
Russians, and to those countries in South-East Asia which are 
still doing all they can to hold the vile flood of communism 
from their countries .2
Recognition he felt would jeopardize the freedom of the countries of South-East
•^Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Minutes, Proceedings and 
Evidence of the Standing Committee on External A ffairs, November 18, 1949, 
pp.24-25.
2Pebates, March 3, 1950, p .462.
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A sia. Therefore Soviet blackmailing tactics at the United Nations in favour of 
Red China had to be resisted rather than appeased. Recognition, in Drew's 
opinion should not precede the working out of a common Western strategy con­
cerning Red China.
During the Korean War the Conservative Party could relax in its 
efforts to prevent recognition of the Peking regime since the government had 
avowed that no recognition would come while the Red Chinese were engaged in 
combat with Canadians. However, the policy of non-recognition was still 
actively supported. W .J. Browne (St. John's West) was especially demon­
strative in his speeches against any move towards recognition. He described 
Red China as a tyranny and warned that we should not offer her any aid in en­
larging their control. This he felt would have been an effect of recognition. 
Browne voiced opinions that frightened calmer heads, in that he appeared to 
be advocating the widening of the Korean conflict into mainland China. Once 
again it must be pointed out that Browne was not in all probability voicing the 
policy of the Conservative party. Although his views generally coincided with
Q
the party attitude, he seemed to be more radical in his outlook.
The position of Canadians in China gave the anti-recognition groups 
ammunition in their struggle to prevent recognition. As of March 10, 1951, 
one hundred and sixty Canadians were still in China. A few hundred had left 
the country prior to that date. Certain Canadians had been subjected to arbi­
trary arrest and had been held incommunicado. The most celebrated case was 
that of the five nuns who had been arrested on trumped up charges and were 
tried publicly in Canton on December 2, 1951.^ This of course outraged the
3Debates, May 14, 1951, pp. 2980-83.
4
Debates, April 21, 1952, p. 1423.
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Catholic elements in Canada and made Quebec, which was against recognition 
from the beginning, even more hostile to the Red Chinese regim e. Public 
opinion in Canada at this time was strongly against recognition. Canadians 
were more disposed to consider that they had troops fighting in Korea than to 
consider legal or diplomatic questions.® "No government in Peking commit­
ting aggression can hope to be taken into the community of nations."® In stat­
ing this Drew made clear his view that recognition, rather than being a pre­
condition for negotiations, could be accorded after Red China had curbed her 
aggressive tendencies and aided in the discovery of ways to end tension in the 
Far East. No solution, however, was conceivable to the Conservatives which 
would give Formosa to the Red Chinese. Legal considerations supporting 
Communist claim s notwithstanding, the freedom of Formosans could not be 
sacrificed nor could the Pacific defensive network be altered in such a manner.
The Conservative policy then was based on a firm belief that the Com­
munist Chinese would have to repudiate their aggressive tendencies before they 
could be considered worthy of recognition. At the same tim e, however, Canada 
could not m erely take Peking's word that Red China was ready to reform. A 
Pacific defensive network was necessary for the security of Canada and the 
West and in line with this necessity Formosa could never fall into the hands of 
the mainland government. Unless one were prepared to argue that Canada had 
a legal right to a Pacific defensive network if it was to accord recognition to 
Red China, we must discern that the Conservative policy was based on what 
were considered to be the political realities of the situation.
5J3.S. Kierstead, Canada in World Affairs, 1951-53 (Toronto: Oxford 
University P r ess , 1956), p .59.
^Debates, March 10, 1952, p .247.
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In addition if legality were to be considered then the merit of the Red 
Chinese claim to Formosa would at least have had to be considered. Never­
theless , Drew had pointed out the immorality of any action designed to place 
the Formosan populace under communist control. In this view he was joined 
by the Liberals and even the C .C .F . who favoured recognition. Morality in 
international relations would be considered of course from the subjective view 
of a national state. Thus it would be a political consideration .
For the Conservatives no arguments, whether based on legalism ,
realism  or optimism, could override the morally influenced political attitude
that Red China's policies had vitiated any chance of recognition under the then
existing circum stances. A statement by John Diefenbaker (Prince Albert) who
later became Prime Minister, typified this position.
Certainly recognition will be hard to justify, however much 
it may appeal legalistic ally to students of international law, 
so long as the people's government continues its programme 
of virtual annexation of North Korea, supplying arms in Indo- 
- China and apparently doing everything it can to spread com­
munism and disruption in other parts of A sia. While it is  
impossible to say with finality that China should never be 
recognized, a good case has not been made for recognition.'7
Again we can see that even if the legal validity of recognition was ad­
mitted, (as it was tacitly in Diefenbaker's statement) in themselves they could 
not be considered a primary reason to extend recognition as far as the Conser­
vatives were concerned. It was one thing to recognize evil as existing but quite 
another to garb it in the cloak of international respectability. Drew added this 
strong moralistic view; "I hope that in this house we will say that our moral 
sense forbids us to accept Chou-En-lai, Mao-Tse-Tung or any of the communist
D^ebates, January 29, 1954, p p .1595-96.
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hierarchy who are murdering their countrymen in the name of China today.”8
Because of their opposition to recognition the Conservatives were quick to
attack Prime Minister St. Laurent's poor choice of words during his world tour 
9in 1954. His words, they said, had made recognition seem inevitable and 
Canada would soon have to support Peking's claim for China's United Nations 
seat. How, they asked, could we let Red China shoot her way into the United 
Nations? There was no reason for recognition at that time as far as the Con­
servatives were concerned and the future should be dealt with as conditions 
arose. It was wrong, they felt, to give Red China hope that recognition would 
come later. There was no use contemplating future contingencies and recog­
nition should not even be considered. Diefenbaker summed up these views by 
stating;
This is  no time to give a fillip to Communism in Asia by 
giving Communism to believe that aggression w ill, if not 
rewarded, at least will be considered as worthy of recog­
nition in the international world of the present.
Drew made it quite clear that he was disturbed by implications he
had gathered from speeches by Pearson.*'1' The opposition leader felt that
Pearson had implied that a conciliatory pose by Red China at Geneva might
prompt recognition. This type of thought was called appeasement by Drew.
He could place no faith in Communist promised and warned that any reliance
12on Communist good faith would constitute a dangerous policy.
Any hope that China would be won away from Russia was ill founded
^Debates, January 29, 1954, p .1619. 
g
See above p .30.
Debates, March 25, 1954, p .3340.
11Speeches made by Pearson in Washington, Chicago and Windsor on 
March 15,19 and 22, 1954 respectively.
■ ^ D e b a t e s , March 26, 1954, p .3373.
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in Drew's opinion. Recognition would only aid communism and indeed com­
munist parties throughout the world had been told to aid in achieving i t .
Neither would trade be benefited by recognition according to the Conservative 
viewpoint. Trade with Russia had proven to Canada's disadvantage and there 
was no reason to believe it would be otherwise with China. The Conservatives 
contended that Britain had gained nothing in the way of trade by recognizing 
Peking. In any event they felt that we should not sell our principles for trade. 
Finally recognition would be interpreted by peoples behind the Iron Curtain
l O
as an abandonment of their cause.
Arguments against recognition which were most often put forward by 
the Conservatives in opposition asserted that recognition would be wrong since 
it would aid the communists while Canada would gain litt le . Legal considera­
tions faded into the background after Drew's early attempt at formulating a 
legal case against a policy of recognition. Only the political questions raised  
had any significance and behind these problems lay the tremendous differ­
ences in political ideology between Communist China and Canada. It must be 
concluded that opinions based on ideological factors in the final analysis 
determined the Conservative outlook on recognition.
2. The Conservative Party in Power
The last period under discussion in conjunction with Conservative 
p o lic ie s  s ta r ted  w ith th e ir  e le c tio n  v ic to r y  in  June of 1957 and ex ten d s until 
the end of 1960. What differentiates this period from the prior one is not so  
much a change in policy but a change in policymakers and to some extent a
-^Debates. March 26, 1954, p .3374.
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change in the factors which influence policy. The party now in power was the 
one which for eight years had been supporting non-recognition. It was not 
likely they would change their stand. It was also a party which had used an 
appeal to Canadian nationalism as a weapon in its election fight and as such 
the official policy became one of non-recognition because of national se lf-  
interest and not non-recognition in deference to American opinion.
The difficulty of Canada's position because of the United States policy 
was not ignored but rather ways of getting around it were explored. "In the 
face of the depth of American opinion on this issue, Canadian policy could not 
have a truly independent character."^  But Mr. Diefenbaker was not satis­
fied to just follow the United States, he tried to se ll wheat and refused to 
become involved in the offshore islands dispute.
In late 1957 an official visit to mainland China by a Canadian trade 
official was undertaken. Of this Prime Minister Diefenbaker said; "There is
nothing inconsistent about endeavouring to trade and at the same time not
15recognizing the government of that country." He also re-iterated that the
position of his government would not change until Red China had expiated her
s in s . "Recognition under international law in the past used to be a juridical 
1 / *
act" but was not a political act which would be understood by Asian coun­
tr ies as a recognition of communism and would consequently weaken Asian 
resistance to the communist menace.
Thus the Prime Minister was faced with the dilemma of agreeing with
14M. Cohen, "A China Policy for Canada," Saturday Night, III, 
(October 11, 1958), 49.
-^Debatest November 1, 1957, p .654.
1 ^ Debates, November 1, 1957, p .654.
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the United States policy of non-recognition but not wanting to appear to be 
merely following the United States lead. Had the problem been a legal one 
there could have been no criticism  of following an American viewpoint if that 
attitude had legal m erit. Since, however, the problem was political,criticism  
was directed at the Conservative government for supporting the American 
stand.
On February 26, 1958, Sidney Smith, the new Minister for External 
Affairs, made a definitive statement of the official government attitude 
towards recognition of Communist China. He said the legal factors which 
applied in any case of recognition had to be separated from the national and 
international considerations . Legality deals with control over territory and 
stability of a regime as well as its willingness to comply with duties assumed 
by its predecessor in international affairs. Smith admitted there was little 
doubt that Peking commanded the obedience of the bulk of the Chinese popula­
tion. As for their willingness to adhere to international law, the Commun­
ists  had declared they would not be bound by any agreements entered into by 
their Nationalist predecessors. Yet Peking had done as much in fulfilling 
its  obligations as many other governments (e .g . other Communist countries) 
then recognized. "It must be admitted, therefore, that most of the legal
requirements for recognition have been fulfilled by the government of the
17People's Republic." The attainment of legal requirements, however, did 
not lead automatically to recognition.
A decision had to be based on furthering Canada's national in terests. 
Trade in his opinion was not a pressing argument for recognition. There was
17Pebates. February 26, 1959, p .1405.
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no proof that recognition would lead to an increase in trade. Red China was 
not above using trade as a political weapon as had been shown in her relations 
with Japan, Malaya and Singapore
The views of Howard Green, after he became Minister of External 
Affairs should be noted. This is  not to say that these views were any dif­
ferent than the previous official policy. "The Canadian government does not 
believe that Red China should be recognized under present conditions."1^
The adherence to the old policy had to continue to make sure we do not let our 
Asian friends down. Recognition could only complicate matters for Canada in 
view of the following statement by Chou-en-lai.
Taiwan is  an inalienable part of Chinese territory. We are deter­
mined to liberate Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu. All U .S . 
armed forces in the Taiwan area must be withdrawn. The Chinese 
people absolutely will not tolerate any plot to carve up Chinese 
territory and create two Chinas. In accordance with this principle 
any country that desires to establish diplomatic relations with our 
country must sever so called diplomatic relations with the Chian- 
Kai-shek clique and respect our country’s legitimate rights in 
- international a ffa irs.20 /
Green felt that there was no reason to accord recognition.
Even if the United States were to accord recognition, it did not follow 
that Canada would. If Canada saw no advantage in recognition what would be 
the sense of giving it. Canadian supporters of recognition were a bit over­
bearing, in Mr. Green's opinion, because they felt the Canadian policy was
^^ D eb a tes , F eb ru a ry  2 6 , 1959, p . 1405 .
-^ D ebates, February 10, 1960, p .938.
20Chou-en-lai as quoted by Green, Debates, February 10, 1960,
p .938.
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21just a reflection of the American point of view.
The conclusions to be drawn from this period are the same as in the 
preceding periods. Recognition will be accorded on the basis of its political 
advantage to Canada not because of any legal requirements which have been 
m et. It was admitted that certain legal requirements existed and that Red 
China had fulfilled them but this did not lead to recognition.
The chief political reason for non-recognition between 1957 and 1960 ' 
was the attitude of the party in power which abjured recognition. The reasons 
for this attitude have been given. Trade obviously was not considered an im ­
portant enough motive to extend recognition since it did grow without it. Our 
seeming subservience to American policy in foreign relations still rankled
many people. "The prevailing Canadian view was that the U .S . policy was
22unrealistic, excessively ideological and dangerously emotive." Yet the 
government was not about to change its own policy merely because it coincided 
with the American policy. The Conservative attitude had been framed with a 
regard to what it felt to be the salient political conditions and only a different 
set of conditions could lead to a change in that policy.
4. The Social Credit Attitude
Social Credit ideas on recognition of Red China were, like the other 
political parties, primarily political. These political ideas were based on a 
strongly moral attitude against the Communist regime in China. Social 
Creditors also seemed generally to have a high respect for Chiang-Kai-shek
^"External Affairs Minister Green Answers Some Questions on 
Canada^ Position," World Affairs, (December, 1960), pp. 13-14.
92 Fred Alexander, Canadians and Foreign Policy, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto P ress , 1960), p . 129.
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and the views of Senator Knowland and the China Lobby in the United States.
Rev. E.G.. Hansell, (McLeod) clergyman and Social Credit member, 
espoused his objections to recognition of Peking in high moral platitudes. 
Legality within the framework of international law lacked significance, his main 
approach being resoundingly political. The degree to which his political views 
were immersed in considerations of religious morality are illustrated by his 
view that recognition should not be granted merely to facilitate trade. This 
would be selling out our principles. He also added a condition of recognition 
which was reminiscent of the doctrine of the idealist, President Woodrow 
Wilson of the United States, by stating that a period of time should elapse 
after a revolution in order that we may determine if the government to be 
recognized is free and dem ocratic.^
The attitude of the Social Credit party, a unique splinter party, was 
openly aggressive. It in many ways mirrored the views of the China Lobby in 
the United States. With regard to Korea, Solon Low, leader of the Social 
Credit Party in the House, advocated marching right up to the Yalu R iver. He 
said we should not be afraid of war with China as we took that risk when we 
went to Korea in the first place. He deplored the blunders of the West in deal­
ing with China and felt that we could have prevented China from falling to the 
Communists. He intimated the Nationalist defeat was not Chiang-Kai-shekTs 
fault. Low agreed that China should not be allowed to shoot her way into the 
United Nations . However, Canada had to avoid showing unfriendliness to the
23A very powerful organization which promoted Chinese Nationalist 
interest in the United States Congress. It was often termed one of the strong­
est lobbies ever to exert pressure on Congress. Senator Knowland, Republican 
leader of the Senate was its leader in Congress.
O A
Debates, November 16, 1949, pp. 1863-64.
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Chinese people and try to support their hopes for a better l i fe . He opposed 
Chiang-Kai-shek's return to the mainland at that tim e. The phrase "at that 
time" indicates however, it might be a future course of action. The United 
Nations should defend Formosa and prevent it from falling to Peking.
Among the Social Credit members there was a strong feeling that 
recognition, rather than leading to peace, would provide an impetus for a 
continued advance of communism in A sia . Hansell said that the Prime Mini­
ster had been influenced too much by M r. Nehru. In addition he charged that 
the Department of External Affairs had for some time been looking at the 
advantages of recognition. Furthermore, Nehru's policy, Hansell felt, was 
looked upon favourably by St. Laurent and the Minister of External Affairs 
during the Liberal administration. This policy was not concurred in by the 
other Asian countries and he quoted United States Senator Knowland as his 
authority on this matter. It was the Social Credit contention that any policy 
of appeasement to Red China (in the form of recognition) would have led to an 
ultimate loss of freedom. Hansell made the foregoing comments by way of 
introducing into the record of the House of Commons the resolution on recog­
nizing Red China passed by the Alberta Social Credit convention in 1953. 
Recognition would result in the loss of Asia and the enslavement of millions 
of people. Any hope of counter-revolution in China would be discouraged.
North America itself would be placed in danger. The Red Chinese record of 
aggression and the probable results of recognition (as they saw them) elicited  
on the part of the Convention an unalterable position against recognizing the 
Peking regim e. Hansell's faith in the views of Senator Knowland was evidenced
^ D e b a t e s ,  March 21, 1952, pp.692-693.
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by his concluding comments in which he urged Canada leave the United
26Nations should Red China enter.
If Hansell's views seem  extreme they pale by comparison to the 
opinions held by his fellow Social Credit member John H. Blackmore 
(Lethbridge). If the China Lobby had had a Canadian branch this gentleman 
would have undoubtedly been its leader. The first familiar refrain he brought 
up was the argument that the revolution in China was not a genuine Chinese 
movement but rather a product of Russian backing. The revolution had been 
aided by the many C ommunists in the Truman administration who blocked aid 
to Chiang-Kai-shek. These Communists later went to work for the United 
Nations. The result of Canadian recognition would be that other countries 
would construe it as a surrender to R ussia. What other answer could be 
arrived at if it is  admitted that the Peking regime is  not truly Chinese and that 
recognition cannot possibly influence the Communists to cease aggression? 
Canada would thus have given comfort to its enemies and would have dismayed 
its friends. Canadians would have consulates full of spies in their midst and 
non-citizens of Chinese background in our country would pass under commun­
ist control. The countries of Asia would have been told to make a deal with 
Peking. The military question was also important as Formosa would make a
O '?
good base from which to attack China. It seemed Blackmore was more pre­
pared to go to war against Red China than recognize her.
The sampling of Social Credit thought seen above is representative of 
the attitude of that party for the whole period from 1949 to 1960. Legal con­
siderations were relegated to a minor role . Anti-communism and right wing
2^Debates, March 26, 1954, p .3395.
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IV
THE C .C .F . VIEWPOINT
Unlike the other political parties in Canada the C .C .F . was strongly 
in favour of recognition of Red China throughout the period except when 
active hostilities were going on in K orea. Basically they appealed for what 
they felt was a realistic approach to the problem. Recognition was neces­
sary to help the cause of world peace. Legal considerations were discussed  
especially by Mr. Coldwell, the party leader. However, the political con­
siderations drastically affected the C .C .F . policy on recognition.
1. Pre-Korean War Period
Alistair Stewart (Winnipeg North) called for a realistic policy on 
recognition. He pointed out that the Nationalist government did not deserve 
Canadian support as they were a corrupt and autocratic group. It was further 
stated by him that the Communist regime in China was not under Russian 
domination. Recognition, he felt, was the correct policy from the Canadian 
standpoint and such a policy would be beneficial if it were well-tim ed. It 
should not be accorded at a moment when it would greatly enhance the pres­
tige of the Peking regime but on the other hand it should be accorded before 
it is too la te  for Canada to b en efit from  the act.  ^ This was another way of 
saying recognition must serve Canadian political ends but not those of 
Peking.
D^ebates, November 17, 1949, p. 1874.
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Mr. Coldwell, leader of the C .C .F . party, framed his argument with 
emphasis on the legal aspect. His legal argument indeed seemed to contro­
vert the idea that recognition of a government is  primarily a political act.
There are some who maintain that, all this notwithstanding, recog­
nition is  merely a discretionary act of policy -  an act of grace 
which may be withheld at pleasure and may legitimately be used as 
a weapon of political intervention or of economic pressure. There 
is  no support for any such view in the bulk of the practice of this 
and other countries. On the contrary, overwhelming authority 
points to the fact that provided the conditions presented by inter­
national law are fulfilled, there is a legal duty to r e c o g n i z e . 2
Fortifying his belief in the justness of granting recognition to Peking, he 
attempted to show how the Communists did indeed live up to the conditions of 
recognition. He noted that the Nationalists had no chance of regaining control 
of the mainland, that consent was no longer part of the law and that no assur­
ance was needed that obligations will be respected by the government to be 
recognized.
Concerning Coldwell's remarks it should be first noted that he ad­
hered to an argument which had only minority support (Lauterpacht) in the 
field of international law as is  shown in the introductory chapter of this paper. 
Yet, minority opinion or not this argument remains a legal one in substance. 
However, to call this a purely legal argument I feel we must be satisfied that 
it is being put forward so that Canada will be in a legally correct position, the 
political situation notwithstanding. Phrased in the interrogative this might 
read: "Would Coldwell have advocated recognition on purely legal grounds if 
that recognition were to be plainly detrimental to Canada?" If the answer 
was in the affirmative then we must admit him to be a lega list.
^Debates, March 7, 1950, p .525.
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However, if the answer was in the negative we must draw the conclusion that 
the legal arguments are put forward to further a political end. Thus basically  
the argument would be political in nature with the legal aspect providing the 
means to attain certain resu lts . The record of Coldwell's statements and 
those of members of his party sufficiently prove, I believe, that Coldwell and 
the C .C .F . were more concerned with the effects recognition of Peking would 
have on Canada than with rendering justice to that regim e. The remarks of 
Mr. Stewart already noted3 seem  to bear out this contention.
This is not to admit the validity of Coldwell’s (and Professor 
Lauterpacht's) arguments. When Coldwell said the "bulk of the practice" did 
not support the position of those who felt recognition is primarily a political 
act, he must have been referring to the fact that in most cases governments 
change in a peaceful, constitutional fashion and recognition is  automatic. This 
would not cause too much controversy. He failed to go further however, and 
see that it was in the exceptional cases, where extra-legal changes occur, 
that the difficulties in recognition occur. It was in the special cases that the 
political nature of the act asserts itself. The situation in China could in no 
way be classified as being typical change in government and thus Canada was 
forced to consider the matter in the light of her own best interests . Positive 
international law thoroughly proves that in cases such as China, each country 
has the right to decide for itself whether legal conditions have been met and if 
recognition will be accorded on those grounds. It would be difficult to find an 
example of recognition in a case such as this being granted in the interests of 
justice rather than self-interest.
O
See above, p .51 .
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In addition, we must consider the alternatives to a legal duty to 
recognize if the conditions are not met. In this case we either have the 
choice of according recognition even though the pre-requisites are lacking 
or we have a duty to refrain from recognizing the government. If we have a 
choice on what other grounds but political ones will we extend recognition?
On the other hand if we have a duty not to recognize a government when it can­
not meet the legal criteria, we are obligated to withhold recognition from or 
cut off diplomatic relations with, such governments. Thus, if independence 
was a condition we could not have recognized the governments of Eastern 
Europe . If a readiness to fulfill international obligations was necessary (even 
though assurance of that intention was not) we should withhold recognition from 
countries which had proven that they would ignore these obligations to Canada 
or any other state. This alone was enough of a legal argument to bar Commun­
ist  China from recognition if  legal arguments were to be dominant.
Clarence Gillis (Cape Breton South) questioned where the responsibi­
lity  reposed for writing, interpreting and enforcing international law. He 
stated, however, that all these fine points of law did not interest him. What did 
interest him was his contention that China now had a communist government be­
cause the people felt anything would be better than the previous regim e. If this 
is  the case Canada must be wary of cutting off China and throwing her into the 
Soviet camp. He also felt that it would be a long time before anyone had complete 
control of China. The British recognition of Peking w as a sm a r t m ove which 
Canada should follow for various reasons includingthe establishment of trade. Red 
China would eventually enter the United Nations and Canada should try every means 
to solve the m ess in China. Gillis was glad that Pearson was trying to gauge 
public opinion but this public opinion had been confused because of all the double
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talk. Canada, he concluded, should accord recognition when the conditions 
Pearson outlined were attained and thus attempt to keep close to the Chinese 
people. ^
Stewart re-iterated some of the views he had voiced the previous 
November to the effect that we should recognize Communist China before it 
is  too late to gain advantage from it. It was not a matter of ideology but of 
fa cts . In reference to Drew's plea for a concerted Western policy on recog­
nition, he said, "I would suggest further that common action is impossible in 
a world of national sovereign states, where what will most appeal to a state 
is  its national interests."^ The British had recognized for trade motives 
while the Americans had not for many reasons including prestige. Although 
the Mao regime was imposed by force, it was accepted by the mass of Chinese 
peasants, workers and intellectuals. The Nationalists had lost this acceptance 
and Formosa was suf fering from their rule and would eventually fall.
He stated that it was in Canada's best interests to recognize Peking 
but could not say exactly when this should be done. Recognition was described 
as a strategic play in the cold war. Non-recognition might surrender by 
default leadership in Asia to Russia. China could not be made into a Soviet 
satellite as the other states of the Soviet bloc but neither could she be an ally 
of the W est. Our policy therefore, should be to insure her neutrality. 
Nationalism is a stronger force in Asia than communism. Drew's legal argu­
ments were dism issed as being invalid and were rather moral than legal. Mr. 
Stewart wished to get down to the basic realities which would in his opinion
^Debates, March 7, 1950, pp .552-53.
^Debates, p .555.
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make the folly of non-recognition obvious.
Chinese intervention in Korea forced the C .C .F . to abandon tempo­
rarily its arguments for recognition. Recognition could hardly be extended to 
a government which was engaged in combat with Canadian troops. However, 
Canada, in legal term s, was not at war with Communist China. If purely 
legal criteria were being used by the C .C .F . to promote recognition, since 
the situation had not changed there was no reason to change its policy. That 
there was a shift in the C .C .F . stand indicates they were motivated primarily 
by political considerations.
2 . The Post-Korean War Period
When the situation in Korea had been stabilized enough to start
thinking in terms of a cease fire and peace settlement, the C .C .F . which had
joined the other parties in refusing recognition after the Chinese intervened
in Korea, did not take long in returning to their original theme. They were
entirely against the United Nations resolution which had branded Red China
an aggressor. Such action, they felt, could only drive Peking into closer ties
with Russia. Stewart spoke of the importance of insuring peace and removing
any hindrances thwarting the chance for negotiation.
At the same time there was another difficulty experienced by 
certain nations, ours amongst them. There was the difficulty 
we had in trying to talk to China when China was not a member 
of the United Nations. It was in refusing such recognition that 
the first blunder was committed."6
The United States was at fault for this state of affairs in Stewart's opinion.
She had never had to retreat and could not do it graciously then even though
that would have been the w isest policy. China was not Canada's real enemy
^Debates, February 2 , 1951, pp. 65-66.
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in the world at that time but rather it was the Soviet Union that posed the threat 
to Canadian security. It was only American pressure which was making Canada 
follow an unwise course.
Thus it seemed that the viewpoint of the C .C .F . had swung full pendu­
lum from eschewing recognition of an aggressor to advocating it once more as 
a means of maintaining peace. This change came in a very short time and it 
seemed to show that the C .C .F . never really changed its original opinion at 
■> all but merely judiciously refrained from stating it at a time when it would have 
been very unpopular. They felt the Korean War should not be allowed to mush­
room into anything larger and thus it was useless to hurl recriminations at and 
shun Red China. Coldwell summed up his party's attitude.
The C .C .F . does not doubt that the invasion of Korea by the 
Chinese armies was unjustifiable and contrary to U.N. policy.
But at this moment every effort must be made to prevent a 
general war. We must not give way to resentment or hysteria 
or assume that war is inevitable. 7
Coldwell maintained his praise of the British position as a realistic 
approach. He condemned the Chiang regime for its corrupt record and called 
for an end to supporting it . If Canada were to negotiate with the Chinese 
Communists we must recognize the Peking regim e. When peace in Korea was 
achieved we could then support the Red Chinese entry into the United Nations. 
Once that entry was accomplished work could begin on peaceful solutions to 
all Far Eastern problems. Included in this would be an agreement for Formo­
san self-determination. It seemed to Coldwell that to have peace we must nego­
tiate but to negotiate we must recognize Red China and if we should recognize 
her we must do everything possible to seat her in the United Nations.
^Debates, February 1, 1951, p .31. t
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Stewart did not let the statements of W.J . Browne pass without com­
ment. He called Browne a reactionary and a China Lobbyist. The Chinese, 
Stewart felt, feared American intentions; perhaps a Korean peace would have 
paved the way for a Nationalist invasion from Form osa. The West should 
have endeavoured to make the Chinese Communists believe that there was no 
intention of overthrowing them by force. Furthermore, he disagreed that 
. Russia controlled China. The Chinese revolution was "revulsion against 
m isery, a revolution against foreign domination."9 China and Russia had areas 
of conflict and it was our best policy to let these conflicts grow rather than 
driving China into Russian arms because of fear of the W est. This argument 
of Stewart's shows the extent to which the C .C .F . was confident that Chinese 
Communists were more Chinese than Communist. The C .C .F . theory has 
not been proven correct as the Peking regime has shown since that time the 
common tendency of new converts, to be extremely fanatic.
Coldwell was not about to let the Prime Minister forget his words of 
March 25, 1954 which intimated the efficacy of recognition. Recognition,
*■'* Coldwell felt, should have been accorded in 1949 but was not and the Korean 
War made it impossible to grant recognition after that, but with fighting ended 
in Korea and negotiations scheduled for Geneva, the time was then ripe. The 
Prim e Minister, Coldwell argued, had presented a good case for extending 
recognition. He had pointed out things the C.C .F . had been sa y in g  for  y e a r s .  
After illustrating so many good reasons for recognition, however, the Prime 
Minister had backed away from it. Moreover, Coldwell was inclined to
Q
°See above p. 38.
9Pebates, March 27, 1952, p .852.
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believe that by negotiating at Geneva with Red China we are by inference admit­
ting recognition of the fact it is the government of C h i n a . H o w e v e r ,  this view 
was unwarranted, as opponents pointed out, as there are precedents which 
clearly show contacts such as at Geneva did not constitute recognition if a state 
was not willing to grant recognition at the tim e.
The C .C .F . party looked upon recognition as a pre-condition to fruit­
ful negotiations leading to the establishment of peace. Recognition they felt 
should be accorded because any other policy hurt the chances of finding solu­
tions for Far Eastern problems. This was the basic reason for their support 
of recognition. Political motives surely formed the foundation of the C .C .F . 
argumentation in favour of recognition.
3 . T h e C .C .F .  During the Conservative Administration
The relative prosperity which had prevailed until 1957 gave way to a 
recession and general slowdown in economic growth for the next few years. 
This, of course, made its impression on the political scene and on the question 
of recognition of Red China. Trade with China was not a more pressing need 
in the eyes of the advocates of recognition. This was especially true in the 
case of British Columbia which stood to gain m ost. A good deal of agitation 
for recognition came from that province. How much of that was due to the 
situation that some outspoken C .C .F . proponents of recognition in the House of 
Commons represented British Columbia ridings, is problematical. It would be 
safe to say, generally, the province was in favour of recognition, especially in 
the light of the harsh effects in that area of the recession.
10Debates, March 27, 1954, p .3341.
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With respect to the issue of trade the C .C .F .  party members were as 
one. Recognition was a pre-requisite to improving trade relations and for this 
reason Canada should have abandoned her blind adherence to a faulty American 
policy.
The agitation for recognition was not silenced by the change in govern­
ment and many political analysts still wrote favourably of recognition. John D. 
Harbron, a political commentator, called the policy of non-recognition a 
blemish on Canada's otherwise good record in international affairs. If Canada 
wanted to assume the role of a mediator in the world it could mediate through 
trade with China according to Mr. Harbron. Many American businessmen and 
public figures wanted more American trade with China. The feelings of 
British Columbia exporters were well known and increased trade in non- 
strategic articles was possible*1 That writer failed to mention that neither 
Red China nor the United States wanted Canadian mediation at that time and 
that opinion in the United States was again becoming more militantly opposed 
to Peking.
Others, such as Marcus Long, who wrote for the Canadian Commen­
tator, felt that Canada in its position as the closest ally of the United States 
could recognize China and not upset the Americans too much. "With such an 
ally so beloved by Americans, so far beyond suspicion, why should Canada 
continue to support the fiction M. Faure has so thoroughly scotched."*^ The 
fiction referred to was the belief that the Nationalist government represented
H j . D .  Harbron, "Canada and Red China," Canadian Commentator, 
(April, 1958), pp.5-6.
12Marcus Long, "The Fiction of China," Canadian Commentator, 
(December, 1958), p . 5.
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all of China and M. Faure, a former prime minister of France had attacked 
this idea. "If the Canadian government had the courage of its convictions it 
would speak its piece without fear of consequences. Our prestige depends on
l O
our honesty and independence." Commentators like Harbron and Long who
held to this type of opinion were appalled at the refusal of Canada to recognize
a concrete reality and instead to hold to the myth of Nationalist control.
The C .C .F . party maintained its position in favour of recognition
and came up with several new and interesting arguments. Frank Howard
(Skeena) contended that the United States would one day alter its policy and
gain trade with Red China while Canada would be left in the cold. He pointed
out that British trade with Red China doubled since the end of the Korean War.
Beyond the question of trade, Canada had a moral obligation to recognize the
de facto government of China. This was the first time morality entered as
14an argument for recognition rather than against it . An independent foreign 
-policy and thus recognition of the mainland government continued to be a 
favourite weapon of the C . C . F . ^
Harold Winch, (Vancouver East),  again outlined his party's view s. 
He pointed out that lack of recognition is  an insult to a proud people. We 
could not depend on the overthrow of the Peking regime as it was solidly en­
trenched and had fostered progress even though through very harsh m eans. 
The argument that China was won by force and that it was not now a peace 
loving state were not important enough to halt recognition as they could be 
applied to numerous states that has been recognized. Norman Robertson, the
13t _Long, p . 5.
Debates, May 20, 1958, p . 262.
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Debates, August 23, 1958, pp.4017-18.
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American Undersecretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, was strongly 
against recognition and had come to Canada in early 1959 to specifically out­
line the American position. However, Winch felt we would be better served 
by listening to prominent Canadians who had travelled to China than American 
public servants. We could not ignore China merely because American policy 
called for the maintenance of the Nationalists. To illustrate his remarks 
Winch noted that James Muir, president of the Royal Bank of Canada, had re ­
turned from China to report that trade opportunities were present even with­
out recognition must com e. Dr. Mackenzie, president of the University of 
British Columbia, was reported by Winch as having said that Canada had to 
get closer to the Orient by recognizing the Peking regim e. Many other peace 
loving countries had recognized China; by December 3, 1958, thirty-eight 
countries had done so . Canada had recognized other communist victories and 
did not tell those countries to expiate their crim es. That was the tim e, he 
felt, to cease being an American satellite by according recognition to the Red 
Chinese. Trade would result from this for the benefit of Canada and especially
British Columbia. The time had come to face the facts and realize that recog-
Ifinition was in Canada's best in terests.
In the period 1957-1960, the C .C .F .  had made the extension of trade 
an important argument for according recognition to Communist China. There 
was no legality involved in the C .C .F .  desire to increase Canadian m arkets. 
As in all other cases the C.C .F . was motivated by political considerations.
^ D ebates, March 23, 1959, pp.2159-62.
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VCONCLUSION
The conclusion to be reached from the study of Canada's consideration 
of recognition of the government on the mainland of China is that political con­
siderations take precedence over legal ones. This view seem s to be substan­
tiated by the implicit admission in many statements of opponents of recognition 
that the Red Chinese government does fulfill the legal requirements for recog­
nition but that this cannot in itself be an excuse to accord recognition. Those 
who do not admit the legality of the communist position go to the other extreme 
and try to cloak their political arguments in legalistic garb. One thing that 
seem s evident, however, is the unwillingness of politicians to completely 
divorce themselves from legal arguments. Legality is much more appealing 
than political pragmatism. Despite th is, in the final analysis, the realities of 
world and domestic conditions are the guidelines which are invoked in making 
a decision such as the one that has faced Canada since 1949.
With a realization that political factors are the dominant causes of a 
decision for or against recognition of a new government, it is almost a truism  
to state that the attitude towards such a decision will vary according to world 
and domestic conditions. This indicates how far from a legalistic attitude the 
particular problem of recognition in positive international law has gone. From 
a legal point of view, what is  right in 1949 is  also right in 1951 given that the 
law does not change in the interim . The political attitude, however, may 
change with the tim es. Thus we note that even the rabid C .C .F .  support of
63
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recognition in 1949 had yielded to a realization that such action was not pos­
sible in 1951 considering the state of world affairs.
In the majority of cases the recognition of a new government would 
render no problem and indeed would almost be automatic. The complexities 
of a strategy imposed by the cold war have dictated that such cannot be the 
case with respect to a communist government and especially of one so power­
ful and contentious as Red China. A further complication arises from Canada's 
relationships with different nations in the world and the variance of the 
approach to recognition of Communist China on the part of these. Thus Canada 
is  pulled in opposite directions by the vigorous opposition to recognition of its 
strongest ally, the United States, and the staunch support of that policy by 
Commonwealth countries with which Canada wishes to maintain close t i e s . A 
usually routine facet of international life has thus been turned into a consider­
ation in the highest realm of policy.
In the particular case of Canada and Red China, the domestic over­
tones cannot be overlooked. The possibilities of huge markets on mainland 
China become a strong argument for recognition in times of economic distress 
in Canada. This is especially true in British Columbia which potentially seem s 
in the best position to gain from trade. On the other hand the French Catholic 
population of Canada would feel it morally inexcusable to recognize the Commun­
ist regime in China. (This is a generalization of course as one could find 
numerous French Canadians supporting recognition). The relative inability to 
effectively measure public opinion on this issue was one reason for the seem ­
ingly hesitant attitude of the Liberal regime until 1957. Many nationalist 
sentiments have been raised because of the feeling that recognition is withheld 
merely to follow blindly the United States lead in foreign affairs. We can see
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that a variety of domestic conditions must also be weighed in considering recog­
nition .
Thus in summary of the whole problem one must conclude that in the 
question of Canadian recognition of Red China we have a situation in which the 
usually easily dealt with matter of recognition has become a matter of some 
political importance. This has been caused by the fact that it was not a matter 
of legality but rather one of political expediency. The labyrinth of conflicting
political considerations, both domestic and international which are all the more
C
confusing because they are not static has prevented a decision which is  sa tis­
factory to the whole nation. One would almost have to surmise that this will 
be a problem inherent in recognition as long as political considerations are 
considered more important than legal ones.
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